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1. Introduction  
Plant closure is an endemic feature of market economies, as producers adjust in response to changing 
market conditions. While such re-optimization can be crucial for long term economic performance, 
convincing evidence shows that plant downsizing can be detrimental to affected workers. Plant 
downsizing increases the likelihood of future unemployment and welfare program participation, in 
addition to having a negative effect on future earnings and health.1 In the present empirical study we 
investigate how family life is affected by plant closure. In particular, we examine the effect of plant 
closure on marital dissolution.  
 
Divorce rates have been rising since the 1960s in most Western countries. While divorce rates 
stabilized and tended to fall in the USA after 1980 (Stevenson and Wolfers 2007), they continue to rise 
in Western Europe (Council of Europe 2005). Recently, the percent of marriages ending in divorce has 
been just below 40 in the EU and around 50 in the USA (Eurostat 2007, Cherlin 2005). The causes of 
the rise in divorce rates are not well understood, but most scholars relate it to fundamental changes in 
the functioning of the labor market, and particularly, women’s increased labor force participation 
(Easterlin 1980, Cherlin 1992, Stevenson and Wolfers 2007).  
 
Exposure to plant closure can affect marital stability through several mechanisms. For example, plant 
closure could lower future family earnings (Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan 1993, Rege, Telle and 
Votruba 2005, Huttunen, Møen and Salvanes 2006),2 reducing future expected consumption 
opportunities within marriage. Alternatively, plant closure could force the affected spouse into a 
different role in the family (for example away from a “masculine” role as a breadwinner), and thereby 
reduce his or her self-esteem and attractiveness as a spouse (Jahoda 1982, Vahtera and Kivimaki 1997, 
Waters and Moore 2002, McKee-Ryan et al. 2005). Our empirical analysis investigates the plausibility 
of these two mechanisms; reduced earnings and role theories. 
 
We study the relationship between plant closure and divorce using a comprehensive, longitudinal 
register database containing annual records for every person in Norway. In our main analytic sample, 
we consider all couples being married in 1995 where the husband is closely attached to the labor 
marked, yielding more than 80,000 couples. The register data allows us to calculate employment 
counts by plant and year, identifying workers who in 1995 were employed in a plant that subsequently 
                                                     
1 See for example Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan (1993), Stevens (1997), Dragano, Verde and Siegrist (2005), Rege, Telle 
and Votruba (2005) and Huttunen, Møen and Salvanes (2006).  
2 Economists often focus on the effect of earnings reductions on marital instability; see Weiss 1997. 
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closed or was stable. Our effect estimate of plant closure on marital dissolution is based on 
comparisons of covariate adjusted divorce rates across married workers originally employed in closing 
and stable plants. The crucial identifying assumption is that plant closure events are uncorrelated with 
unobserved individual determinants of marital dissolution. Importantly, if this assumption does not 
hold, we would expect workers in closing plants to have a higher propensity to divorce even prior to 
the closure event. The richness of our dataset allows us to test this, and to do additional specification 
checks testing for unobserved differences across workers in closing and stable plants.  
 
Our empirical results suggest that husbands’ exposure to plant closure has a substantial effect on 
marital dissolution. The marriages of husbands originally employed in plants closing between 1995 
and 2000 were 11 percent more likely to be dissolved by 2003 than comparable marriages of husbands 
in stable plants. We do not observe a stronger association between future low earnings and plant 
closure among divorced workers than among workers who stayed married. This suggests that the 
effect of husband’s plant closure on divorce is not due to an unexpected reduction in earnings. 
Interestingly, however, we find no significant effect of wives’ exposure to plant closure on likelihood 
of divorce. Moreover, the effect of husbands’ exposure to plant closure on divorce is larger among 
couples where the husband is “the main bread winner” with earnings exceeding 1.25 of the wife’s 
earnings. These findings are consistent with role theories, in which the husband’s self-esteem and 
attractiveness decline when he fails to fulfill the traditional “masculine” role as a breadwinner.  
 
Using rich register data, this paper presents the first empirical investigation identifying a casual link 
between a spouse’s job loss and divorce. The relationship between job loss and marital instability has 
been an important empirical research topic within the social sciences for a long time (see e.g. Jahoda, 
Lazarsfeld and Zeisel 1933, Liker and Elder 1983, Jensen and Smith 1990, Kraft 2001, Charles and 
Stephens 2004, Eliason 2005, Hansen 2005, Schøne and Hardoy 2007).3 Due to data limitation, 
however, previous analyses may be plagued by omitted variable bias; workers experiencing a job loss are 
likely to hold unobservable characteristics (ineffective, easily bored, lazy, unfocused, non-cooperative, 
limited social skills, etc.) that impact both the likelihood of job loss and marital dissolution.4 In this paper 
                                                     
3 See Ström (2003) for a review of empirical research on relationships between unemployment and the family. 
4 Charles and Stephens (2004) find that the likelihood of divorce rises after a spouse is being laid-off but does not change 
after a spousal displacement due to plant closings. This is also what we may expect to find in the presence of omitted variable 
bias. Omitted variable bias seems a minor issue in Eliason (2005), who investigates the effect of displacement due to 
establishment closures on marital dissolution using Swedish administrative data. He finds a positive (though often barely 
significant) effect of closure on the risk of divorce. However, he compares workers in establishments that close down fully 
with workers in establishments that possibly downsize substantially (p. 5-6). Moreover, he does not seem to exclude from his 
sample couples that married just ahead of or at the time of the closure, for whom the closure might have been fully 
anticipated at the time of marriage. These two issues appear likely to bias the estimated effect downwards. 
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we circumvent this omitted variable bias by focusing on job losses that are associated with plant 
closures. 
 
This paper also adds to the literature investigating the effect of “new information” on marital 
instability (Becker, Landes and Michael 1977, Weiss and Willis 1997, Charles and Stephens 2004).5 
The main idea in this literature is that new information about a spouse that was unanticipated at the 
time of marriage, often labeled a “shock”, can cause divorce by altering the spouses’ initial belief of a 
positive expected benefit from the marriage (Becker, Landes and Michael’s 1977). Becker, Landes and 
Michael (1977) and Weiss and Willis (1997) construct the shock-variable as the contrast between 
realized earnings and earnings estimated in a regression run on cross-sectional or panel data. Charles 
and Stephens (2004) apply job displacement and disability to measure shocks. The general result in 
these studies is that the shocks affect marital instability. To avoid biased results, the measures of shock 
should represent information that was unanticipated by the spouses at the time of marriage. It might, 
however, have been evident to the spouses at the time of marriage that the earnings level could not be 
sustained or that the health of a spouse would deteriorate, leading to omitted variable bias.6 In the 
present paper we utilize plant closure events to capture unanticipated shocks. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses possible mechanisms through 
which plant closure can affect the likelihood of divorce. Section 3 presents the empirical strategy. 
Section 4 describes the dataset. Section 5 presents our results, specification and robustness checks, as 
well as discussions of the plausibility of different channels through which plant closure can cause 
divorce. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Mechanisms 
Work by Gary Becker (Becker 1973, 1974, 1991, Becker, Landes and Michael 1977) is the typical 
point of departure for studies in economics on causes of marital instability. The main idea is that a 
union is formed and maintained if both spouses expect utility of the marriage to exceed utility from 
available alternatives, like being single or marrying someone else. The quality of the match would 
vary considerably among married couples, depending on the pool of alternative spouses and the 
information available on possible spouses. In this model, important determinants of marital instability 
include the quality of the initial match, investment in marital-specific capital (e.g. children) and new  
                                                     
5 See also Hoffman and Duncan (1995) and Böheim and Ermisch (2001). 
6 The bias may be enhanced by attenuation bias if there is measurement error in the shock variable. 
6 
information about the spouse’s attractiveness as a partner. New and unanticipated information about a 
spouse, a “shock”, can cause the spouses to reconsider the expected benefits of the marriage. If an 
unpleasant surprise makes a spouse alter the previous belief that the expected benefit of the marriage is 
positive, the couple will divorce.  
 
Consistent with Becker’s theory of marital instability, economists have typically focused on marital 
instability of unanticipated reductions in the pecuniary gains from marriage (see e.g. Weiss 1997). 
Future plant downsizing events can be hard to anticipate at the time of marriage, and it is well 
documented that plant downsizing reduces affected workers’ future earnings (Jacobson, Lalonde and 
Sullivan 1993, Stevens 1997, Huttunen, Møen and Salvanes 2006, Rege, Telle and Votruba 2005). 
This suggests that unanticipated earnings reductions can be an important mechanism through which 
plant closure can affect marital instability.7  
 
Not only pecuniary shocks can precipitate divorce, but so can any unexpected deterioration of a spouse’s 
attractiveness as a mate, like mental or physical health. Convincing evidence suggest plant closure 
imposes health related stress on affected workers (e.g. Vahtera and Kivimaki 1997, Dragano, Verde and 
Siegrist 2005, and Rege, Telle and Votruba 2005). Thus, unanticipated deterioration in physical or 
mental health might be an additional mechanism through which plant closure can affect divorce. Plant 
closure may also increase marital instability through affecting the spouses’ investment in marital specific 
capital. For example, a couple may delay having children as a consequence of plant closure. 
 
In discussing effects of unemployment or job displacement on marital instability, sociologists often 
employ social exchange theories (Scanzoni 1979, Cook 1987), family stress theories (Hill 1949, Burr 
1973, Aneshensel 1992) or role theories (Linton 1936, Nye and McLaughlin 1982). Similar to 
Becker’s theoretical framework, social exchange theories and family stress theories imply that 
reductions in earnings can increase marital instability, and so could also e.g. poorer mental or physical 
health. Role theories, however, would emphasize the detrimental effects on marital well-being of a 
husband failing to live up to a traditional role of a breadwinner. Consequently, job displacement can 
lead to shifts of roles within the household. Male unemployment may put greater responsibility for 
                                                     
7 Whether the overall effect on divorce of a reduction in the pecuniary gains from marriage is positive or negative is not 
obvious (Becker, Landes and Michael 1977, Charles and Stephens 2004). The shock may affect both the expected gain within 
the current marriage and the expected gain from dissolving the current union. For example, an unanticipated reduction in the 
husband's earnings will reduce the expected within-marriage utility of the spouses, which would raise the likelihood of 
marital dissolution. On the other hand, however, the expected gain from an outside opportunity, like becoming single or 
remarrying someone else is likely to decline if the husband experiences an earnings reduction. This tends to stabilize the 
current union. Still, most empirical studies in this field tend to find a negative rather than a positive effect of unanticipated 
reductions in earnings on marital dissolution, at least for the husband. 
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financial management on the wife, and the unemployed husband with a working wife may be under 
pressure to increase his responsibilities for household tasks (Gallie, Gershuny and Vogler 1994, 
Bittman et al. 2003). Such renegotiation of domestic roles could be breaking down traditional gender 
roles, possibly involving significant problems for male gender identity and increase conflicts over 
housework, roles and authority structures within the marriage (Liem and Liem 1990).  
 
Role theories suggest that job displacement is likely to impose a smaller threat on the wife’s than the 
husband’s identity. Social norms and patterns have allowed women to develop and appreciate a greater 
range of non-employment-related roles. Women’s greater tendency of experiences out of the labor 
force (rearing children) would provide them multiple sources of positive identity and more available 
social networks, possibly shielding them from the severity of the impact of unemployment (Gershuny 
1994). Jahoda (1982, p. 53) puts it this way, “unemployment hits them [women] less hard than men 
psychologically speaking because an alternative is available to them in the return to the traditional role 
of housewife that provides some time structure, some sense of purpose, status and activity”. Thus, the 
effect of plant closure on marital well-being is likely to differ with the sex of the exposed mate.8 This 
is consistent with empirical studies documenting that displaced workers experience mental distress, 
and the distress is generally more severe among men than women (McKee-Ryan et al. 2005, 
Grzywacz and Dooley 2003, Waters and Moore 2002). 
3. Empirical Strategy 
Our dataset allows us to measure plant downsizing by looking at changes in employment levels by 
plant and year. We will refer to the plant downsizing rate (PDR) as the percentage change in 
employment between 1995 and 2000. More precisely, the plant downsizing rate in worker i’s plant is 
given by 
(1) i
ii
i
x
xx
PDR
95
0095 −
= , 
                                                     
8 In the typical framework of Becker, Landes and Michael (1977), an unexpected earnings reduction of one dollar should 
have the same effect (ceteris paribus) on marital instability regardless of whether the earnings decline is experienced by the 
wife or the husband. There are, however, several possible mechanisms that would result in an asymmetric effect across the 
spouses within this framework. For example, marital well-being might hardly be affected by the wife going from paid work 
to housework, since she may be similarly effective in producing marital well-being through earning money and through 
engaging in housework. Husbands, on the other hand, may in general be less able to maintain marital well-being if having to 
reallocate time from paid work to housework. This could be due to specialization, but also to social costs of disobeying social 
norms or not fulfilling traditional roles. Hence, by giving the notions of costs and benefits in the framework of Becker, 
Landes and Michael (1977) a wide definition, this framework seems able to endorse the main ideas of these sociological 
theories. 
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where ix95  and 
ix00  are point-in-time plant employment counts in 1995 and 2000, denoting number of 
workers (full-time equivalents) in worker i’s plant at the end of year, excluding worker i himself. In 
the following, we will refer to a plant reducing employment by more than 90 percent (i.e. PDR>. 90) 
as a closing plant, and a plant with no reduction in employment (i.e. PDR ≤ 0) as a stable plant.  
 
We restrict our sample to married couples in 1995, where the husband in 1995 was employed in a 
plant that either closed by 2000 (i.e. PDR>. 90) or was stable during this period (i.e. PDR ≤ 0). We 
estimate the following linear probability model for the likelihood that a couple married in 1995 
becomes divorced by 2003: 
(2) Ai,03 = α0 + ηWi + αXXi + ui     
where 
Ai,03 ~ indicator that the couple i is divorced by 2003 
Wi ~ An indicator that the plant in which the husband is employed in 1995 is 
closing (i.e. PDR>. 90). 
Xi ~ vector of 1995 characteristics of couple i, including socio-economic 
variables for both the couple and each of the spouses individually, 
indicators of spousal dependency, downsizing experience of the wife, etc. 
ui ~ Error term with mean zero 
 
The parameter of interest in equation (2) is η, which captures the incremental increase in a couple’s 
likelihood of divorce due to plant closure (of the husband’s 1995 plant of employment), relative to 
couples in which the husband is working in a stable plant. 
 
Estimation of equation (2) will produce unbiased estimates of η provided that plant closure events are 
determined by exogenous economic shocks and are independent of unobservable determinants of 
divorce. This identifying assumption will not hold if workers with higher unobserved propensities for 
divorce are more likely to work in plants that close, which may be the case for several reasons.  
 
One possible reason could be that workers with higher unobserved propensities for divorce could self-
select into (or out of) plants that subsequently close for some unobserved reason. For example, it 
might be that more stable partners can better foresee an upcoming closure and that they therefore tend 
to leave such plants before the closure occurs. If so, spouses remaining in closing plants are more 
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inclined to divorce for reasons unrelated to the upcoming closure event. Since we would not observe 
these reasons, we would get an upward bias in the estimated effect of plant closure on divorce. 
Alternatively, it could be that workers with particular characteristics detrimental to marital stability 
("workaholics") are attracted to plants with higher risk of decline (recent start ups); or that plants with 
oscillating number of employees are over-represented by workers with lower ability to stay in long 
relationships. However, if such unobserved variables were important for our results, we would expect 
higher rates of divorce among workers in closing plants even prior to the closure event. In our 
empirical analysis we are able to test for this possibility. 
 
Also, closing plants may be concentrated in disadvantaged neighborhoods or municipalities with poor 
labor marked conditions and high divorce propensities. Moreover, social interaction effects may result 
if a worker’s likelihood of divorce increases when more of his neighbors are divorcing (see e.g. 
Moffitt 1983, Lindbeck, Nyberg, and Weibull, 1999, Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan 2000, Rege, 
Telle and Votruba 2007). If closing plants are concentrated in neighborhoods with high divorce rates, 
this could bias our estimate of η. In our empirical analysis, we address these potential sources of bias 
by including neighborhood fixed effects. 
 
It should be noted that, absent the sources of omitted variable bias identified above, our results 
potentially under-estimate the impact of plant closure on divorce since our plant closure measure is 
based on a worker’s original plant of employment. Job mobility across closing and stable plants would 
therefore tend to attenuate our estimates.  
4. Dataset Description 
We utilize a register database provided by Statistics Norway called FD-trygd. It is a rich longitudinal 
database with records for every Norwegian resident from 1992 to 2005, containing individual 
demographic information (marital status, spouse identifier, sex, age, time of marriage9, number of 
children), socio-economic data (years of education, income, wealth), current employment status (full 
time, part time, minor part time, self-employed), industry of employment, indicators of participation 
on any of Norway’s welfare programs, and geographic identifiers for county, municipality and 
neighborhood of residence.  
                                                     
9 This variable is not in FD-trygd if the couple married before 1992. However, for preceding years, time of marriage is 
available in another database also managed by Statistics Norway; and the managers of this database kindly made this variable 
available to us. We used a unique personal identifier available in all public registers in Norway to merge this variable onto 
our dataset.  
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In particular, the database contains records for employment “events” since 1995. These events, captured 
by individual and date, include entry and exits into employment, changes in employment status (full 
time, part time, minor part time), and changes in plant and firm of employment.10 These employment 
records are constructed by data analysts at Statistics Norway from raw employment spell records 
submitted by employers, and verified against employee wage records (not available to us) to ensure the 
validity of each spell and to eliminate records pertaining to “secondary” employment spells.11 
 
Based on the employment records, we constructed plant-level employment counts at the end of year 
1995 and 2000. The counts were constructed as measures of full-time equivalents (FTEs), with part 
time and minor part time employment measured as 0.67 and 0.33 FTEs, respectively. Excluded from 
these counts were any person identified in FD-trygd as self-employed or receiving assistance that 
should have precluded full time work (those receiving unemployment benefits, rehabilitation pensions 
or disability pensions). Plant-level FTEs were then used to construct the measure of plant downsizing 
from 1995 to 2000 as defined in Equation (1). The measure, which we refer to as the plant downsizing 
rate (PDR), captures the percent decline in FTEs over 1995-2000. For instance, plants that fully closed 
over a given period were recorded as having a PDR=1 for that period; plants with FTE counts 
declining by 50% were recorded as having PDR=0.5.  
 
Our main analytic sample comprises couples of native Norwegians that were married in 1995. 
Moreover, we restrict the sample to couples where at least the husband was closely related to the labor 
marked in 1995. This means that he was full- or part-time employed with tenure of at least one year in 
the plant, and he did not receive assistance that should have precluded full time work (pension or 
unemployment benefit). To make sure that our results would not be driven by the effect of PDR on 
subjects eligible for (early) retirement pension, we do not allow the husband to be older than 55 years 
in 1995 (most employees are eligible for generous early retirement pension from the age of 62, and the 
eligibility requirements for unemployment benefits are also less restrictive for subjects above 60). We 
also restrict the sample to couples where none of the spouses received a welfare pension (e.g. elderly 
pension, disability pension, early retirement pension) or social assistance in 1995. This implies that 
earnings are an important source of income for the couples. As a precaution against the PDR variable 
being correlated with unobserved individual determinants of divorce, we exclude the couple if the 
husband works in a plant with less than 10 FTEs in 1995. Finally, if a couple gets married just ahead 
                                                     
10 Throughout, we use the term “plant” to refer to the establishment where an employee works, which is distinct from the 
firm of employment (as firms can consist of multiple plants).    
11 If an individual was employed in multiple plants at a given time, primary employment was determined by employment 
status and recorded income (not available to us) from each source of employment.   
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of or along with a downsizing event, the event could not reasonably be assumed unanticipated. Hence, 
to assure that the couple is unlikely to have anticipated the downsizing event at the time of marriage, 
we exclude couples married after 1992. To facilitate interpretations of our results, we restrict the 
analysis to couples where the husbands work either in a stable or closing plant. The resulting dataset 
consists of 80,932 couples, living in 10,659 different geographically defined neighborhoods.  
Variables capturing couple and spouse socio-economic characteristics were constructed based on FD-
trygd records for 1995. A large number of such variables are included in all models:  
• age, for each spouse: 30 categories 
• difference in age between spouses: linear 
• years of education for each spouse: 4 categories (<9, 9-12, 13-15, ≥16)  
• difference in years of education between spouses: linear 
• number of children, for each spouse: 5 categories (0, 1, 2, 3, ≥4)  
• age of youngest child below 18 in family: 8 categories (0-2,2-4,..,14-17)  
• children of another bed, for each spouse: 2 categories (0, ≥1)  
• year of marriage: 13 categories 
• income, for each spouse: linear and quadratic 
• income, sum of both spouses: quadratic 
• difference between the husband's and the wife's proportion of the couple's income: linear 
• net wealth, sum of both spouses: linear and quadratic 
• earnings, for each spouse: linear and quadratic 
• years of labor marked experience, for each spouse: 5 categories (≤ 10, 10-15, 15-20, 20-25, 
>25) 
• difference in labor marked experience between spouses: linear 
• received sick money in year, for each spouse: 2 categories 
• hours worked, for each spouse: 4 categories (<10, 10-20, 20-30, >30 hours per week)  
• industry of plant, for each spouse: 11 categories  
• employed in public sector, for each spouse: 2 categories 
• years of tenure in 1995-plant, for each spouse: 8 categories (<2, 2-3, 4-5, 6-7, 8-10, 11-15, 
>15, missing)  
• number of FTEs in 1995-plant, for each spouse: 9 categories  
• wife received unemployment benefit: 2 categories  
12 
• wife’s PDR: linear and quadratic12 
• spouses employed in same firm: 2 categories 
• rate of FTEs in plant over FTEs in firm 1995, for each spouse: 9 categories  
• mean age of employees in 1995-plant, for each spouse: 9 categories  
• mean years of education of employees in 1995-plant, for each spouse: 9 categories  
• mean income of employees in 1995-plant, for each spouse: 9 categories 
• rate of employees in 1995-plant women, for each spouse: 9 categories 
• rate of employees in 1995-plant currently married, for each spouse: 9 categories 
• rate of employees in 1995-plant never married, for each spouse: 9 categories 
• rate of employees in 1995-plant currently divorced, for each spouse: 9 categories 
• rate of married male employees in 1995-plant whose wife is working, for each spouse: 9 
categories 
 
Table 1. Summary statistics  
Fraction/Mean St. dev. Fraction/Mean St. dev. Fraction/Mean St. dev.
Divorced by 2003 0.070 - 0.069 - 0.072 -
PDR husband above .9 (plant closure) 0.369 - - - - -
Age husband 43.27 6.87 43.07 6.90 43.61 6.79
Age wife 41.14 7.12 40.95 7.14 41.46 7.06
Income husband 327 373 310 262 336 313 314 052 312 057 303 051
Income wife 167 366 142 395 166 665 164 917 168 566 91 741
Years of education husband 13.25 2.86 13.19 2.86 13.34 2.84
Years of education wife 12.55 2.58 12.53 2.57 12.58 2.61
Years of working experience husband 22.35 5.87 22.21 5.91 22.59 5.78
Years of working experience wife 15.35 6.62 15.15 6.60 15.69 6.65
Tenure husband 8.32 6.01 8.10 5.90 8.71 6.18
Tenure wife a 5.69 5.12 5.57 5.05 5.88 5.24
Net wealth of household 288 619 9 266 563 295 282 9 626 528 277 202 8 615 093
FTE of husband's plant 192.46 382.03 190.42 430.42 195.97 280.29
FTE of wife's plant  b 228.36 570.24 236.31 601.55 215.05 513.27
Years of education in husband's plant 12.76 1.47 12.73 1.45 12.81 1.50
Years of education in wife's plant  b 12.85 1.56 12.82 1.55 12.90 1.57
Rate of female in husband's plant 0.295 0.236 0.283 0.230 0.317 0.244
Rate of female in wife's plant b 0.701 0.252 0.700 0.255 0.704 0.246
Rate of unmarried in husband's plant 0.277 0.134 0.291 0.136 0.253 0.128
Rate of unmarried in wife's plant b 0.246 0.155 0.248 0.155 0.242 0.154
Rate of married in husband's plant 0.610 0.133 0.598 0.131 0.630 0.132
Rate of married in wife's plant b 0.634 0.166 0.632 0.166 0.637 0.166
Rate of divorced in husband's plant 0.076 0.049 0.075 0.050 0.079 0.048
Rate of divorced in wife's plant b 0.077 0.063 0.077 0.064 0.077 0.062
#obs 80 962 51 123 29 839
 b Calculated over the subsample of 63,860 couples w here the variable is not missing for the w ife
Total Husband PDR≤ 0 Husband PDR>.9
 a Calculated over the subsample of 61,580 couples w here the w ife's tenure is not missing 
 
 
                                                     
12 PDR is set to zero if the spouse was not employed in 1995; and a dummy variable indicating that PDR is set to zero for this 
reason is also included.  
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Summary statistics for some of these variables are presented in Table 1. The first column reports 
means and the second standard deviations. About 7.0 percent of the couples got divorced from 1995 to 
2003. In our main analytic sample, about 37 percent of the husbands worked in a plant in 1995 that 
downsized by more than 90 percent from 1995 to 2000. In the next four columns of the table we report 
the means and standard deviations for the sample of husbands employed in stable plants (PDR≤ 0) and 
in closing plants (PDR>0.9). Although not different in a statistical sense, the divorce rate by 2003 is 
slightly higher in closing plants (7.2 %) compared to stable plants (6.9 %). The means of all the 
variables are similar across the two sub-samples. Taken together, couples appear similar on 
observables across stable and closing plants.  
5. Empirical Results 
5.1. Main Regression Results 
As described in the empirical section we estimate the effect of plant closure on the likelihood of 
divorce through the inclusion of a plant closure dummy. The estimated plant closure coefficient 
captures the incremental increase in a couple’s likelihood of divorce due to plant closure (in the 
husband’s 1995 plant of employment), relative to couples where the husband is working in a stable 
plant. Table 2 presents our main results. Models 1 and 2 are the logit and the OLS regressions without 
controlling for neighborhood fixed effects; while Model 3 includes 10,659 geographically defined 
neighborhood fixed effects in the OLS regression.13 The estimated marginal effect is similar in 
magnitude (0.008) across all three models and suggests that plant closure significantly increases the 
likelihood of divorce.  
 
Table 2. Main estimation results  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Husband PDR>.9 1.22e-01 8.19e-03 7.83e-03
(3.11e-02)** (2.02e-03)** (2.10e-03)**
Neighborhood fixed effects Included
Mean of marginal effects 7.80e-03
R-squared 0.04 0.17
Mean divorce rate 0.07 0.07 0.07
Observations 80962 80962 80962
Dependent variable: Divorced by 2003
Notes: +, * and ** denote signif icance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses, corrected for non-independent residuals w ithin husbands' plant. All 
regressions include covariates described in text and either 19 county f ixed effects or 
10659 neighborhood f ixed effects.  
                                                     
13 We were unable to run the logit model including all these neighborhood fixed effects. 
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As discussed in Section 3, one concern for our empirical strategy is that plant closure events might be 
concentrated in disadvantaged geographic areas with poor labor market conditions and high divorce 
propensities. If so, including dummies for a number of geographically defined areas would be 
expected to reduce the estimated effect. The modest effect of including 10,659 neighborhood fixed 
effects (see Models 2 and 3) indicates that such geographic differences are not important. Nonetheless, 
we view the model including neighborhood fixed effects as the preferred one (Model 3). The result 
suggests that marriages of husbands originally employed in plants that closed between 1995 and 2000 
were about .78 percentage points more likely to be dissolved by 2003 than comparable marriages of 
husbands in stable plants, an increase of about 11 percent. 
5.2. Specification Tests 
Our estimated effect of plant closure on divorce would be biased if, at the outset in 1995, workers in 
closing plants have a higher propensity to divorce for reasons not controlled for. If true, however, we 
would expect workers in closing plants to have a higher propensity to divorce even prior to the closing 
event. We test this in Models 2 and 3 reported in Table 3. For comparison, Model 1 repeats the results 
of our preferred model from Table 2. In Model 2 we check whether the rate of divorced employees in 
the husband's plant of employment in 1995 is correlated with the upcoming plant closure events.14 If 
so, it would indicate that unobserved plant characteristics could be a problem. Similarly, in Model 3 
we estimate the ”effect” of plant closures over 1996-2000 on the likelihood of divorce between 1995 
and 1996. If unobserved plant characteristics were driving our main result, we would expect these 
preceding divorces (1995-1996) to be correlated with the later closure events (1996-2000).15 The 
results of these two tests show an insignificant covariate-adjusted correlation between plant closures 
and preceding divorces. This suggests that our main result is not seriously biased by unobserved 
characteristics causing workers in closing plants to have a higher propensity to divorce. 
 
                                                     
14 To reduce multicollinearity, we do not include the plants’ rate of divorced employees as covariate in this model. 
15 To disable possible effects on divorces by 1996 from downsizing events over 1995-1996, we restrict the sample to 
employees in plants that were stable from 1995 to 1996. Note that the redefinition of the period over which the closure 
variable is defined and the restriction to stable plants in Model 3 is not what causes the insignificant result, as the regression 
in Model 5 is on the same sample and yields a significant effect of closure (1996-2000) on divorce by 2003. 
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Table 3. Specification tests 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Dependent variable: Divorced by 2003
Rate of divorced 
employees in husband's 
plant in 1995
Divorced by 1996 Divorced by 2003 Divorced by 2003
Husband PDR>.9 7.83e-03 7.96e-04 -2.95e-04 6.42e-03 9.32e-03
(2.10e-03)** (8.01e-04) (1.69e-03) (2.27e-03)** (3.48e-03)**
Sample restrictions Plant stable over 
1995-1996 
Plant stable over 
1995-1996 
Included PDR constructed over 1995-2000 1995-2000 1996-2000 1996-2000 1996-2000
R-squared 0.17 0.66 0.23 0.18 0.26
Observations 80962 80962 38813 70426 38813
Mean divorce rate 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.07 0.07
Notes: +, * and ** denote signif icance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for non-independent residuals w ithin 
husbands' plant. All regressions include covariates described in text (including neighborhood f ixed effects).  
 
A related concern could be that stable partners are able to self-select out of unstable plants prior to the 
closure. Since it appears more difficult to foresee plant closure "through" a stable period, however, we 
would expect the estimated effect to decline when restricting to plants stable over 1995 to 1996. The 
effect of plant closure over 1996 to 2000 on divorce by 2003 is estimated in Model 4, while in Model 
5 we perform the same regression on the sub-sample of plants that were stable from 1995 to 1996. 
Comparing the results of Models 4 and 5 we see that restricting to stable plants does not reduce the 
estimated effect; to the contrary, the estimated effect increases somewhat. This suggests little reason 
for a concern that workers with high unobserved propensities to divorce are overrepresented in 
unstable plants. 
5.3. Robustness  
Table 4 presents several robustness checks. First, Models 2-5 investigate the robustness of our main 
result to variations in the definition of a closing plant. In Models 2 and 3, we can see that letting 
closing plants comprise plants downsizing more than 80 and more than 95 percent respectively, has a 
modest impact on the estimates. Model 4 shows that excluding fully closing plants (PDR=1) from the 
sample also has a fairly modest impact on the estimated effect. In Model 5 the sample is expanded to 
include workers in plants with PDR between 0 and 0.9, including an additional dummy capturing 
downsizing events from 90 to 0 percent. We can see that also intermediate downsizing events affect 
the likelihood of divorce.  
 
In Models 6 and 7 we investigate whether the estimated effect varies when the sample is restricted to 
workers in plants with at least 20 and 50 FTE in 1995 (and not 10 as in our main analytic sample). We 
see that these restrictions only have fairly modest impacts on our estimate.  
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As described in our empirical strategy we define plant downsizing as the percentage change in 
employment between 1995 and 2000. This definition includes typical downsizing events where a 
proportion of the workers are laid-off, but it could also include “reorganizations” or merges. For 
example, a firm may shut down one of its plants to co-locate with one of its other plants. Alternatively, 
a plant is merged with a plant of another firm. Such reorganizations may be accomplished without 
laying off workers. Previous work has established that such reorganization can have serious 
detrimental effects on the well-being of affected workers (Røed and Fevang 2007). Here we 
investigate whether the effect on marital instability of such reorganizations differs from the effect of 
more typical downsizings. In Model 8 we explore this by splitting the plant closure variable in “typical 
closure” and “reorganization”. How to make such a split in our data is clearly somewhat arbitrary. We 
redefine a plant closure as a “reorganization” if (i) more than 90 percent of the workers exit the plant 
during the same year, and (ii) among those exiting, at least 90 percent (and at least ten workers) were 
immediately rehired to the same next firm. The results of Model 8 indicate that the effect on marital 
instability is similar for “reorganization” and “typical closure”.  
 
Table 5 addresses how long it takes from plant closure events occur till they materialize in marital 
dissolution. We see that plant closure events between 1995 and 2000 affect the likelihood of divorce 
already by 2000. The effect increases the most in the years up to 2003, and then tends to level off in 
2004 and 2005. Thus, it appears that most of the overall effect is exhausted by 2003.  
 
Table 4. Robustness checks 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
Husband PDR>.9 7.83e-03 6.55e-03 7.60e-03 7.04e-03 6.84e-03
(2.10e-03)** (2.95e-03)* (1.99e-03)** (2.35e-03)** (2.95e-03)*
Husband PDR>.8 7.30e-03
(2.02e-03)**
Husband PDR>.95 8.05e-03
(2.18e-03)**
Husband PDR in <0,.9] 3.79e-03
(1.51e-03)*
Husband PDR>.9 
"typical closure"
7.21e-03
(2.51e-03)**
Husband PDR>.9 
"reorganization"
8.79e-03
(2.84e-03)**
Sample redefinition
Obs. with husband 
PDR in [.9,.8> also 
included
Obs. with 
husband PDR in 
[.95,.9> excluded
Obs. with 
husband PDR=1 
excluded
Obs. with husband 
PDR in <0,.9] also 
included
FTE ≥ 20 in 
husbands' 
1995 plant
FTE ≥ 50 in 
husbands' 
1995 plant
R-squared 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.10 0.19 0.23 0.17
Mean divorce rate 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
Observations 80962 84850 77960 65520 170554 64276 44007 80962
Notes: +, * and ** denote signif icance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for non-independent residuals w ithin husbands' plant. All 
regressions include covariates described in text (including neighborhood f ixed effects).
Dependent variable: Divorced by 2003
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Table 5. Impact over time on the likelihood of divorce of husbands being exposed to plant 
closure  
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Husband PDR>.9 4.61e-03 5.81e-03 7.48e-03 7.83e-03 7.98e-03 7.96e-03
(1.96e-03)* (2.07e-03)** (2.10e-03)** (2.10e-03)** (2.13e-03)** (2.22e-03)**
R-squared 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.17 0.17
Mean divorce rate 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.08
Observations 80962 80962 80962 80962 79754 79072
Dependen variable: Divorced by given year
Notes: +, * and ** denote signif icance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for 
non-independent residuals w ithin husbands' plant. All regressions include covariates described in text (including neigborhood 
f ixed effects).  
5.4. Discussion of Mechanisms: Reduced Earnings and Role Theories  
As discussed in Section 2, there are many different mechanisms through which plant closure can affect 
the likelihood of divorce. The richness of our dataset allows us to empirically investigate the 
plausibility of two of these mechanisms; reduced earnings and role theories. 
Economists have traditionally emphasized effects of changes in consumptions opportunities on marital 
instability (Weiss 1997). Within this tradition the interpretation of our main result would be that plant 
closure reduces expected earnings and thereby reduces consumption opportunities of the spouses, 
which affect marital instability. In Models 1-2 in Table 6 we report results documenting that plant 
closure events do reduce the future earnings of affected workers.16 In Models 1 and 2 the dependent 
variable is earnings of the husband and the aggregate earnings of the spouses in 2003. In Model 1 we 
see that husbands originally employed in plants that closed between 1995 and 2000 have significantly 
lower earnings in 2003 than comparable husbands in stable plants. Moreover, Model 2 shows that this 
reduction in the husband’s earnings is not replaced by the wife increasing her earnings: The estimated 
effect of plant closure on the sum of the spouses’ earnings is very similar to the estimated effect on the 
husband’s earnings. 
 
Notably, Models 3 and 4 show that the estimated effect of plant closure on earnings is similar in 
magnitude for the sub-sample of divorced couples (Model 3) and for the sub-sample of couples still 
married in 2003 (Model 4). This indicates that the negative effect of closure on earnings is not mainly 
explained by a decline of earnings due to an actual divorce; for example if a divorce causes a spouse to 
leave the labor force. More importantly, this also suggests that the income reduction associated with 
plant closure is not a likely channel for the effect of plant closure on marital dissolution. If plant 
closure increases the likelihood of divorce by adversely affecting earnings, we would expect to 
                                                     
16 For similar findings see e.g. Huttunen, Møen and Salvanes (2006) and Rege, Telle and Votruba (2005). 
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observe a stronger association between low earnings and plant closure among divorced workers than 
among workers who stayed married.   
 
In Models 5-7 we further explore the likelihood of the earnings mechanism. If we assume that the 
earnings mechanism is important, we would expect the estimated effect of closure on divorce to 
change if we control for earnings after 1995. The reason is that a negative effect on divorce of post-
1995-earnings would be loaded onto the estimated effect of (post-1995) closure when post-1995-
earnings are omitted. Thus, by including post-1995-earnings we would expect the estimated effect of 
closure to decline. To explore this empirically, we first re-estimate our preferred (Model 3 in Table 2) 
including controls for the earnings of the husband in 2000. In Model 5 we can see that this inclusion of 
future earnings barely moves the estimate. Since divorce can affect earnings, Model 5 may, however, 
have an endogeneity problem. Thus, in Model 6 and 7 we do a similar test by first re-estimating our 
preferred (Model 3 in Table 2) on the sub-sample of couples still married in 2000 (Model 6). Then, in 
Model 7 we use the same sample, and control for the earnings of the husband in 2000. We see that the 
estimated effect in Models 6 and 7 are virtually identical. Thus, adding information on the husband’s 
future earnings has no impact on the estimate. This provides additional evidence that the reduction in 
earnings from plant closure is not an important reason why plant closure causes divorce.  
 
Role theories would emphasize the husband's inability to fulfill a traditional role as a breadwinner 
when explaining an effect of plant closure on marital dissolution. If this is true, we should see a larger 
effect of husbands’ exposure to plant closure on likelihood of divorce among couples in which the 
husband is the main bread winner. We explore this hypothesis in Model 8 by restricting the sample to 
couples where the husband is the main breadwinner, with earnings exceeding 1.25 of the wife’s 
earnings. Comparing with our main analytic sample (Model 3 in Table 2), we see that the effect of 
closure on divorce is larger when we restrict the sample to couples where the husband is the main 
breadwinner. This is consistent with role theories.17  
 
Model 9 provides additional evidence supporting role theories as an important mechanism for the 
effect of plant closure on divorce. Here we report results based on a dataset constructed like our main 
analytic sample, except that the conditions put on the husband (regarding labor market attachment etc., 
                                                     
17 Clearly, we are not arguing that these findings could not also have been explained within the framework of Becker, Landes 
and Michael (1977); see footnote 8.  
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cf. Section 4) is now put on the wife (and v.v.). Notably, we do not find a significant effect of wives’ 
exposure to plant closure on marital dissolution.18  
 
Table 6. Estimates of alternative dependent variables  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9
Dependent variable:
Husband's 
earnings 
2003
Sum of 
earnings of 
spouses 
2003
Sum of 
earnings of 
spouses 
2003
Sum of 
earnings of 
spouses 
2003
Divorced by 
2003
Divorced by 
2003
Divorced by 
2003
Divorced by 
2003
Divorced by 
2003
Husband PDR>.9 -2.12e+04 -2.21e+04 -2.24e+04 -1.90e+04 7.69e-03 3.57e-03 3.55e-03 1.14e-02
(2.74e+03)** (2.90e+03)** (3.00e+03)** (1.06e+04)+ (2.10e-03)** (1.05e-03)** (1.05e-03)** (2.35e-03)**
Wife PDR>.9 -4.09e-03
(2.74e-03)
Sample redefinition
Couples still 
married in 
2003
Couples 
divorced in 
2003
Couples still 
married in 
2000
Couples still 
married in 
2000
Husband's 
earnings>1.25
*wife's 
earnings
Wives closely 
attached to 
labor market
Additional 
covariates
Earnings of 
husband in 
2000 (third-
order 
polynomial)
Earnings of 
husband in 
2000 (third-
order 
polynomial)
R-squared 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.83 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.19 0.20
Observations 80962 80962 75271 5691 80962 76287 76287 65142 64023
Mean of dependent 
variable
445840.80 680085.07 677433.10 715160.94 0.07 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.07
Notes: +, * and ** denote signif icance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level. Robust standard errors in parentheses, corrected for non-independent residuals w ithin plant of spouse 
closely attached to labor market. All regressions include covariates described in text (including neigborhood f ixed effects).  
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we estimate the impact of plant closure on divorce using a panel data set comprising 
more than 80,000 married couples in Norway. Our results suggest that plant closure in the husband’s 
plant of employment significantly increases the likelihood of divorce. The marriages of husbands 
originally employed in plants that close down from 1995 to 2000 were 11 percent more likely to be 
dissolved by 2003 than comparable marriages of husbands in stable plants. The dataset enables us to 
perform a number of robustness and specification tests, which all support the reliability of this result. 
 
Economists have traditionally focused on marital instability of unanticipated reductions in the 
pecuniary gains from marriage (see e.g. Weiss 1997). In contrast to this, we find that the effect of plant 
closure on marital dissolution does not appear to be driven by an adverse effect on expected future 
earnings. Plant closure is associated with substantial reductions in workers’ future earnings. However, 
we do not observe a stronger association between future low earnings and plant closure among 
                                                     
18 Some previous studies find an effect on marital instability of the wife being affected by earnings reduction or job 
displacement (e.g. Charles and Stephens 2004, Hansen 2005), while others do not (e.g. Becker, Landes and Michael 1977, 
Jensen and Smith 1990). 
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divorced workers than among workers who stayed married. This suggests that the effect of husband’s 
plant closure on divorce is not due to an unexpected reduction in earnings. 19 
 
Role theories from the field of sociology have emphasized how job displacement can lead to shifts of 
roles within the household, and consequently may have differing effects across sexes. For the husband, 
displacement can constitute serious social distress if he fails to fulfill a traditional role as the main 
breadwinner. For the wife, however, weaker attachment to the labor market may lower the tension 
resulting from having to deal with both the job and social norms related to keeping the house and 
being a caring mother. Consistent with such role theories, we find no significant effect of wives’ 
exposure to plant closure on the likelihood of divorce. Moreover, the effect of husbands’ exposure to 
plant closure on divorce is larger among couples in which the husband is the main bread winner.  
                                                     
19 Charles and Stephens (2004) also argue that an earnings mechanism may not be important in explaining the effect of job 
displacement on divorce. They conclude that “a partner’s noneconomic suitability as a mate due to a job loss may be more 
important than financial losses in precipitating divorce” (p. 489). 
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